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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE BOYER COMPANY, a Utah
corporation, and H. ROGER
BOYER dba THE BOYER COMPANY,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs .

Case N o . 14442

E . KEITH LIGNELL and
BURTON M. TODD,
Defendants and
Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF CASE

The plaintiffs brought suit to recover from defendants
a commission for broker 1 s services rendered by them under a
listing agreement and an earnest money receipt and offer to
purchase.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

A judgment of no cause of action and a dismissal with
prejudice was entered by the Trial Court against both plaintiffs.

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants ask the Court to affirm the judgment
of the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondents disagree, in part, with the facts as
set forth by appellants.

In addition, appellants have omitted

many salient facts relied upon by the Trial Court and necessary for this Court to understand fully the elements of this
case.

Plaintiffs view the important facts as follows:
On August 18, 1972, the individual plaintiff, H. Roger

Boyer ("Boyer") applied for an individual real estate broker's
license with the Department of Business Regulation, Real
Estate Division.

That license was issued on December 14,

1972, and during all times relevant thereafter H. Roger Boyer
held, as an individual, a valid Utah Real Estate Broker's
License (Finding No. 3, R. 194, Exhibit 8-P). The Boyer
Company, a Utah Corporation, was incorporated on November 8,
1972 (Finding No. 1, R. 193). It neither applied for nor held
a Real Estate Broker's License at any time relevant to this
suit (Finding No, 2, R. 193). In the latter part of September,
1973, Boyer received a telephone call from Mr. Douglas Callister ("CaHister") , his cousin, who was also the attorney
for the Osmond Brothers, a singing group.

Mr.

Callister

solicited the help of Boyer in locating property in Utah
that would make a suitable investment for the Osmond Brothers.
-2-
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Pursuant to this request, Boyer called Burton M. Todd ("Todd")
shortly thereafter and inquired whether or not Todd would be
willing to sell the Shaughnessey Apartments, a small apartment
building located in Salt Lake City, Utah, owned by him and
E. Keith Lignell ("Lignell").

Todd answered in the affirma-

tive, that they might be willing to make a sale upon the
fulfillment of certain terms and conditions.
During all times relevant to this matter Boyer was the
agent for the Osmond Brothers and was acting for and on
their behalf in the proposed purchase (Finding No, 3, R. 94,
T. 138, Callister Depo. pp. 44-45).

The Osmonds were, at

this time, also looking at other properties with Mr. Boyer
(T. 146, Callister Depo. p. 44). Mr. Lew Costley ("Costley"),
the Osmond Brothers' accountant, and Callister met in Salt
Lake City with Boyer to discuss the Shaughnessey Apartments
and other potential real property investments on behalf of the
Osmonds.

One item discussed was the defendants1 need for

money and its impact on the price the Osmonds would offer.
Boyer indicated that he understood that the defendants1 were
in need of money.

At that time, Boyer apparently did not

have a listing on the property but felt that he could obtain
one from the defendants (Callister Depo. pp. 8-10).
Thereafter, Boyer procured from Todd a listing agreement authorizing him to procure a sale of the Shaughnessey
Apartments for the sum of $915,000.00 (T. 14-15, Exhibit 1-P).
The listing agreement set forth the following conditions:
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1.

That a condition precedent to the payment of any

commission to H. Roger Boyer was the consummation of the
transaction or the closing of the sale of the apartments and
the actual receipt of the proceeds therefrom by the defendants
(Exhibit 1-P, Finding No. 4f R. 194).
2.

Any sale of the property was subject to the app-

roval of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Northwestern") the holder of the permanent mortgage (Exhibit 1-P.)
3.

The dental building adjacent to the apartments, also

owned by defendants, was specifically excluded from any sale
(Exhibit 1-P, Finding No. 4, R. 194).
On October 11, 1973, the corporate plaintiff, The
Boyer Company, prepared and presented to defendants for their
acceptance an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
wherein the Osmond Brothers, a Utah Partnership, purported to
offer to purchase the subject apartments for the sum of
$921,500.Q0.

By its terms the said proposal was conditioned

upon the buyers being able to assume, and assuming, the
$512,000.00 mortgage bearing interest at seven percent 2 then
outstanding with Northwestern and sellers agreeing to leaseback the property for three years.

(Finding No. 7, R. 19 4).

Approval of Northwestern was vital to sellers because
the mortgage contained a "call" clause and absent approval,
sellers would be obligated to pay a penalty of $35,000 (T. 84,
MacLeod Depo. pp. 14, 15, 28) .
2

The prevailing interest rate at that time was around
10% (T. 33, 215, MacLeod Depo. p. 23).
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The document provided that any offer expired if not accepted
in writing within one day, (Finding No.

_•. Ls4 , and that

any sale should close on or before October 18, 1973 (Exhibit
1-P).

In addition, the document contained the following

provision:
"It is understood and agreed that the terms
written in this receipt constitute the entire preliminary contract between the purchaser and the
seller, and that no verbal statement made by anyone
relative to this transaction shall be construed to
be a part of this transaction unless incorporated
in writing herein," (Exhibit 1-P).
Two other provisions of the Earnest Money Agreement are
significant.

It provided that any agreement to pay a com-

mission was of no force or effect if there existed a presently
effective listing agreement with any other agent (Finding No.
15, R. 196) , and that if the offer was not accepted the
return of the earnest money would cancel the offer without
damage to the agent (The Boyer Company)

(Finding No. 7, R.

195).
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was
delivered to Todd and Lignell by Boyer on October 11, 19 73.
Upon receipt of the document defendants determined that certain provisions contained therein were unacceptable to them;
however, because defendant Todd was going out of town the
next day, he executed the document and placed his initials in
the lower right hand corner above line 53 in anticipation of
certain modifications that would be placed there by defendant
Lignell (Finding No. 8, R. 195). On October 12, 1973, Lignell
deleted lines 22, 23 and 24 of the said Earnest Money Receipt
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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and Offer to Purchase relating to the lease-back of property
by the sellers, initialed the deletion, signed the document
and delivered the same to plaintiff corporation.

The corpor-

ate plaintiff then mailed the document to the Osmond Brothers
in care of Costley at Ogden, Utah, where it was received on or
about October 15, 1973.

(Finding No. 9, R. 195). Thereafter,

Boyer telephoned Callister and advised him of the changes to
the Earnest Money Agreement made by Todd and Lignell.
Upon receipt of the document, Costley placed it in
his desk drawer; he did not sign it or do anything to indicate his acceptance thereof on behalf of the Osmonds (T. 136).
The acts of the defendants constituted a counter-offer, which
counter-offer was never accepted by the proposed buyers, the
Osmond Brothers.

(Finding No. 11, R. 195). The defendants

did not accept the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
and the offer expired by its own terms and ceased to have any
legal force or effect (Finding No. 10, R. 195).
Within a week to ten days after Costley received the
amended document he telephoned Callister and discussed it
with him.

(T. 119). In that conversation the two decided

that the Osmond Brothers would agree to enter into the Earnest
Money Agreement as modified (T. 118-121).

On October 15,

1973, Boyer telephoned Todd, advised Todd that the deletion
could be worked out and requested that Todd telephone the
insurance company (T. 21, Boyer Depo. p. 43, T. 83). That
evening, Todd telephoned Theodore C. MacLeod ("MacLeod") f the
Regional Manager of Northwestern at his home in Boulder,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Colorado, informed him of the proposed transaction, told him
about the Osmonds and inquired concerning the possibility of
having the Osmonds assume the existing mortgage at the 7%
rate.

Todd again called MacLeod at his office on October 17th

and 18th concerning the proposed transaction (T. 81) . Todd
was told by MacLeod that Northwestern would not permit the
Osmonds to assume the loan absent an increase in the interest
rate or some other modification (T. 27, 38, 157). Subsequent
thereto, Todd had further telephone conversations with MacLeod
throughout the month of October and into the month of November
concerning the transaction (T. 81). Todd informed Boyer
that the insurance company had refused his request to allow
3
the Osmond Brothers to assume the loan at the 7% rate

(T. 50).

On October 26, 19 73, Todd, Lignell, Boyer and Earl D.
Tanner met for lunch and discussed, in the framework of MacLeod's
refusal, a method by which the assumption of the Northwestern
loan could be arranged.

During that conversation, Boyer re-

quested that he be allowed to talk directly with Northwestern,
which permission was granted by the defendants (T. 209).
On October 30, 19 73, Boyer met with Costley and Callister to discuss incentives that they might offer to Northwestern in order to induce them to allow the Osmond Brothers
to assume the mortgage.

Some of the incentives discussed were

the prepayment of interest and a slight increase in the interest
%oyer, however, denied that Todd had ever told him the
assumption had been refused but did acknowledge that he had
that impression (T. 209) .
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

rate.

4

Although discussions were had, no specifics were agreed

upon concerning what the Osmonds would or would not do in
order to induce Northwestern to allow them to assume the loan
(T. 138). 5
On November 2, 1973, Boyer telephoned MacLeod to determine the status of the proposed assumption.

MacLeod told Boyer

to have Todd give him a call (MacLeod Depo. p. 8 ) . Boyer
then telephoned Todd and asked Todd to write MacLeod a letter
and send a copy to Boyer (T. 50). Since Todd had already made
a number of telephone calls to MacLeod, he interpreted Boyerfs
request to be an indication that Boyer did not believe that
he had talked extensively with MacLeod; nevertheless, he
agreed to write the letter (T. 50).
On November 11, 1973, Boyer telephoned MacLeod to determine whether MacLeod had received a phone call or a letter
from Todd (T. 216). MacLeod told Boyer to contact Todd and
discuss that matter with him.
On November 16, 1973, five days after his telephone
conversation with MacLeod, Boyer called Todd and inquired
whether or not the defendants were going to sell.

Todd inter-

preted this to be an ultimatum requiring a yes or no answer
4

While Boyer indicated that the Osmonds would consent
to a 2% rate increase (Boyer Depo. p. 46), Callister had in
mind nothing more than a 1/4 to 1/2 percent rate increase
(Callister Depo. p. 25).
5

Boyer testified that at that meeting a prepayment of
interest was considered and that they discussed what the
Osmonds might be willing to do and under what conditions they
might waive their right to insist on the 7% assumption (T.
213).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and faced with that ultimatum, stated that the defendants
were not prepared to go forward at that time, whereupon Boyer
requested that he be sent a letter setting forth that fact
(T. 29, 163). Todd agreed to do so, prepared the letter on
November 19, 1973, and sent it to Boyer (Exhibit 5-P). Thereafter, on November 26, 1973, Boyer returned to Costley the
$5,000 that had been deposited with him by the Osmonds.
(Exhibits 14-D, 17-D).
ARGUMENT
Point 1
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN ITS ADOPTION OF THE FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

SUCH FINDINGS ARE ENTITLED

TO GREAT WEIGHT.
On the 29th of September, 1975, the Court rendered its
Memorandum Decision, wherein it determined that the claims of
plaintiffs should be dismissed with prejudice.

Further, the

Court requested that defendants1 counsel prepare the necessary Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 187-188).
This defendants did and submitted them to the Court for its
review along with a copy to plaintiffs1 counsel (R. 199). The
proposed Findings of Fact were,signed by the Court on the 28th
day of October, 19 75.

Within the ten day period provided in

Rule 52(b), U.R.C.P., plaintiffs filed a "Motion Objecting To
and To Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", wherein
most of the issues raised in this appeal were presented to the
Court (R. 200-211) .

Specifically, plaintiffs sought to attack
-9-
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Finding No, 6, that defendants had exercised good faith, and
Finding No. 17, that they were free to terminate the listing
agreement —

the same findings attacked herein.

In their

place plaintiffs proposed, among other things, a finding
that defendants had exercised bad faith in their dealings
with plaintiffs (R. 203, Proposed Finding 13(g)).

Those pro-

posed amendments were rejected by the Trial Court after careful deliberation and hearing argument of counsel.

Having

failed in a direct attack upon the Findings and Conclusions
of the Court, plaintiffs now seek to attack them indirectly
by arguing that these Findings and Conclusions should not be
entitled to the presumption of validity that is generally
accorded to findings and conclusions of the court.

See Hardy

v. Hendrickson, 27 Ut.2d 251,492p.2d 28 (1972); Lynch v.
McDonald, 12 Ut.2d 427, 367 P.2d 464 (1962).
The preparation of the proposed findings and conclusions by defendants is in accord with the long established
custom of the Court.

In reviewing this practice this Court

stated in Merrill v. Bailey & Sons Co., 99 Ut. 32 3, 10 6 P.2d
255 (1940):
"The duty of making findings and conclusions
is that of the trial court. In doing so it has
become customary to have the prevailing party submit proposed findings and conclusions, and by rule
of court the adverse party may submit objections
and proposed amendments thereto—all of which was
done in this case."
The practice attacked by plaintiffs is not unique to this
state but has been done with approval in many other jurisdictions (See, e.g., Jefferson v. City of Anchorage, 513 P.2d
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1099 (Alaska/ 1973); Wyoming Farm Bureau Mut. Ins, Co. v.
May, 434 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1967).
As in the Merrill case/ plaintiffs submitted objections and proposed amendments to the Findings and Conclusions
entered by the Court*

After deliberation and argument the

proposed findings of plaintiff were rejected and the proposed
findings and conclusions prepared by defendants were reaffirmed.
Thus, the Trial Court twice deliberated over the Findings and
Conclusions that are being here attacked by appellant, thereby, in respondents' view, not diminishing therefrom as plaintiffs suggest, but rather enhancing the weight that should be
given to them.
Plaintiffs attack certain of the findings upon the
proposition that they are not specifically mentioned in the
Court*s Memorandum Decision.

The Court, however, clearly

stated that its Memorandum Decision was not intended to be
exhaustive nor to specifically detail each and every fact
upon which it based its decision.

The Court therein stated:

"There are many more reasons the court
could state for reaching the conclusions as set
forth, including reference to the many cases
cited by respective counsel." (R. 187).
It is clear that there is no conflict between the
Memorandum Decision prepared by the Court and the Findings and
Conclusions ultimately entered by it.

Even if there had been

a conflict, however, under the law of this state, the formal
findings must prevail.

Park W

Jamieson, 12 Ut.2d 141, 364

P.2d 1 (1961) .
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

It is the well established rule of this state that
findings of fact and conclusions of law as entered by the
trial court are granted a presumption of validity and unless
clearly erroneous should not be overturned.
29 Ut.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973).

Martin v. Martin,

Such presumption must

attach to the Findings and Conclusions entered in this case.
Point II
THE BOYER COMPANY WAS NOT LICENSED AS A REAL ESTATE
BROKER AS REQUIRED BY THE LAWS OF THIS STATE.
Section 61-2-1, U.C.A. provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person,
co-partnership, or corporation to engage in the
business, act in the capacity of, advertise, or
assume to act as a real estate broker or a real
estate salesman within this state without first
obtaining a license under the provisions of this
chapter." (Emphasis added)
An unlicensed broker is precluded by statute from maintaining
an action to recover compensation for any act done or service
rendered for which a license is required.

Section 61-2-18,

U.C.A. states:
"No person, partnership, association, or
corporation shall bring or maintain an action in
any court in this state for the recovery of commission, a fee, or compensation for any act done
or service rendered, the doing or rendering of
which is prohibited under the provisions of this
act to other than licensed real estate brokers,
unless such person was duly licensed hereunder
as a real estate broker at the time of such act
or the rendering of such' service»" (Emphasis
added)
Both the plaintiffs and defendants agree that if The
Boyer Company was not licensed as a real estate broker during
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the time in question, the corporation cannot recover herein.
This is in conformity with the law of this state relating to
compensation for unlicensed activities.

See Chase v. Morgan,

9 Ut.2d 125, 339 P.2d 1019 (1959); Mosley v. Johnson, 22 Ut.2d
348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969); Lyman W

Taylor, 14 Ut.2d 362, 384 P.2d

407 (1963); Eklund v. Elwell, 116 Ut. 521, 221 P.2d 849 (1949);
Olson v. Reese, 114 Ut. 411, 200 P.2d 733 (1948); Smith v. American Packing & Provision Co., 102 Ut. 351, 130 P.2d 951 (1942).
Plaintiffs herein attempt to fuzz the distinction
between H. Roger Boyer, an individual, and The Boyer Company,
a corporation.

Since a corporation is a separate legal entity,

however, that distinction must be kept clearly in mind.
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.)

1

7, p. 37; 16-14-4, U.C.A.

The undisputed facts clearly show that H. Roger Boyer, an
individual, applied for an individual broker's license on
August 18, 1972 (Exhibit 8-P). The application form set
forth three categories of licenses that might be obtained
corporation, partnership or individual.

—

Boyer, in his own

handwriting, applied for an individual license (T. 219, Exhibit 8-P). The subject license application further requested
disclosure of the name and address of each member or officer
if the applicant was a corporation; that portion of the license application was left blank by Boyer.

In addition, dif-

ferent affidavits were called for depending on whether the
°Plaintiffs, on page 16 of their brief, state "It is
undisputed that unless The Boyer Company was licensed as a real
estate broker during October and November, 1973, The Boyer
Company cannot maintain this action."
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applicant was a partnership, an individual or a corporation.
Boyer filled out the individual affidavit, but left the corporation affidavit blank.

The testimony is uncontroverted

that the license issued to Boyer was an individual broker's
license (T. 220, 222, 277-279-)..7
Subsequent to the date the license application was
submitted by Boyer but prior to the time the license was
issued, The Boyer Company was incorporated. 8 Subsequent to
that date, the individual license of Boyer was renewed by him
on January 1, 1973 (T. 222, 278). On December 19, 1973, one
month after the proposed sale had been terminated, the Department of Business Regulation, Real Estate Division, received an
application prepared by Boyer for the renewal of a real estate
broker*s license wherein, for the first time, The Boyer Company was designated as a corporation and H. Roger Boyer was
designated as an official of that corporation (T. 279, Exhibit 8-P). Thus, it is evident that Boyer appreciated the
distinction between The Boyer Company, a corporation, and
himself as an individual, and knew that it was necessary to
notify the Department of Business Regulation that it was the
corporation that was now seeking to obtain a broker's license.
In fact, Boyer testified that he was an employee of the
Counsel for plaintiffs also recognized that the license
as issued was an individual license to Mr. Boyer; as Mr. Rooker
stated, "Now if I understand you then the broker license in
this instance was issued to Mr. Boyer personally," (T. 268).
^The Boyer Company was incorporated on November 8, 1972,
some two and a half months after the licensing application
was prepared.
-14-
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corporation from which he merely drew a salary and that any
real estate commissions that were earned were commissions
earned by the corporation (T. 223).
Although the testimony of Mr, Francis is confusing at
best, he apparently was of the opinion that his department
made no distinction between an individual and a corporation
for licensing purposes,

Mr, Francis testified, however, that

he had only been the Department Director for a year and a half
and had no idea whether his predecessor distinguished between
individuals and corporations (T. 285), The documents produced,
however, indicated that the Department did make a distinction
in that it required different information and different procedures if the applicant were an individual or a corporation.
Further evidence indicated that corporate applications were
filled out differently than was the application of Boyer, and
that the licenses issued to corporations contained different
wording (Exhibits 8-P, 23-D and 24-D).

Defendants submit

that the evidence indicates that the Department clearly distinguished between licenses issued to individuals and corporations, and had done so for a number of years.
Plaintiffs seek to avoid the clear requirement of the
law by taking refuge in what plaintiffs claim is a valid
interpretation of the law by an administrative agency.

De-

fendants submit that the testimony of Mr, Francis not to the
contrary, the Real Estate Board clearly distinguished between
individuals and corporations.

Mr.

Francis testified, how-

ever, that even he was not sure of his interpretation and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that he was concerned about it in view of the language of the
statutes (T. 273, 272, 269).

(

Even assuming that the interpretation of the statute
by the Department was such as plaintiffs1 urge, plaintiffs
can take no refuge therein.

The clear law of the State

of Utah is to the effect that administrative interpretations
are not controlling and are not binding upon the Courts, although such interpretations will be given some weight when
not out of harmony with the apparent intent of the statute.
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, 30 Ut.2d 1Q2, 514 P.2d
217 (19 73); State yy Hatch, 9 Ut.2d 288, 342 P.2d 1103 (1959).
Even the Coleman case, upon which plaintiffs rely, recognizes
that an administrative interpretation is of value only when
uncertainty exists as to the interpretation of the statute
and there is a rational basis for it in the provisions of the
law.

Even if these two tests are met, however, the admin-

istrative interpretation is not controlling.

Coleman v.

Utah State Land Board, 17 Ut.2d 14, 403 P.2d 781 (1965).
In that portion of its Memorandum Decision relating to
the licensing statute, the Court stated:
"However, the law is clear and unequivocal.
And the court is of the opinion that the corporation is barred from recovering." (R. 187).
Defendants submit, as the Court found, that the law on this
matter is clear and unequivocal.

The Legislature specifically

provided that corporations must have a real estate broker's
license and that if they fail to do so they may not maintain a
suit for recovery of compensation based thereon.
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That the Legislature contemplated issuing broker's
licenses to corporations is further indicated by other provisions of the applicable statutes.

Section 61-2-2, U.C.A.

includes within the definition of broker "all persons, partnerships , associations and corporations, foreign and domestic,"
who for a fee sellf rent, exchange, etc. real property.

Sec-

tion 61-2-9(c), U.C.A. provides that:
"Each real estate broker's license granted
to any firm, partnership or association consisting
of one or more persons, or to a corporation, shal1
entitle such real estate broker to designate one of
its officers or members, who upon compliance with
the terms of this chapter shall, without the payment of any further fee, upon issuance of said
broker"s license, be entitled to perform all of the
acts of a real estate salesman contemplated by this
chapter." (Emphasis added)
As set forth in the above provision, any firm, partnership or association consisting of one or more persons, or
a corporation, to whom a valid brokerfs license had been
issued, can designate an individual within that firm, partnership, association or corporation, to function as a real
estate salesman without the necessity of paying an additional
fee.

Of particular note is the limiting feature of the statute

that provides that such privilege is only afforded to organizations consisting of more than one person, or to corporations, it being for the obvious reason that an individual
broker would be able to perform the functions of both a broker
and a salesman.

The statute, therefore, places the corporate

broker on an equal basis with the individual broker in that
it can both broker and sell property upon the payment of the
same fee as is required of an individual.
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If any doubt remained that the Legislature made a
clear distinction between individuals and corporations for
licensing purposes, that doubt is dispelled by the clear wording of the penalty provisions for a violation of the licensing requirements.
Section 61-2-17, U.C.A. provides:
"Any person violating a provision of this
act, in addition to being subject to suspension
or revocation of license, shall, upon conviction
of a first violation thereof, if a person, be
punished by a fine of not less than $100.00, nor
more than $500.00, nor by imprisonment for a term
not to exceed ninety days, or both; and if a corpora t ion , be punished by a fine of not more than
$1,000.00. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent violation, if a person, shall be punished
by a fine of not less than $500.00, nor more than
$1,000.00, or by imprisonment for a term not to
exceed two years, or both; and if a corporation,
be punished by a fine of not less than $2,000.00,
nor more than $5,000.00. Any officer or agent
of a corporation or any member or agent of a
partnership or association, who shall personally
participate in or be accessory to any violation
of this act by such corporation, partnership or
association, shall be subject to the penalties
herein prescribed for individuals." (Emphasis
added)
It is interesting to note that the above statute provides that upon any violation by a person, such person is
liable for a fine or imprisonment or both.

If, however, the

violation is by a corporation, said corporation is subject
only to a fine.

The corporate fine is, in all cases, greater

than the fine provided for a violation by an individual.

The

Legislature clearly recognized that it would be impossible to
imprison a corporation but not an individual, hence, the
individual is subject to a fine and imprisonment while the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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corporation is only subject to a large fine.
It is also particularly interesting to note that any
officer or agent of a corporation who participates in or is
an accessory to the violation of the act is subject to the
penalties provided for individuals, i.e., fine and imprisonment.
Section 61-2-21, U.C.A. deals with the mechanics for
revoking a previously issued license.

That section by its

specific language relates to persons, partnerships, or corporations, yet another clear indication that the licensing
requirements were intended to apply to corporations.
Plaintiffs base their entire argument upon the proposition that Section 61-2-6(a) requires the applicant for a
broker's license to pass an examination, provide references,
etc., and that thus it is impossible for a corporation to be
an applicant.

Defendants submit, however, that the testing

of the corporation can be accomplished as provided in Section
61-2-9(c), i.e., an official may be designated to represent
9
the corporation in that testing capacity.
In view of the clear language of the statute, and the
clear pronouncement of the Legislature that a corporation
requires a broker's license, the administrative interpretation
advocated by plaintiffs must fail as having no rational basis
^Defendants submit that in many areas including contracting, engineering and architecture, it has logn been the practice
of licensing agencies to issue licenses to corporations engaged in those areas. See Section 58-23-10, U.C.A.
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1
in the law.
Defendants1 further submit that, notwithstanding the
contentions of plaintiffs, and the interpretation of the
statutes urged by them, plaintiff corporation still cannot
recover.

As cited by plaintiffs, Mr. Francis testified that

following the Division's approval of the association between a
licensed individual and a brokerage corporation, both the
corporation, in its name, and the associated individual may
properly act as brokers (T. 279-82, 299). The evidence is
clear that the corporation, The Boyer Company, did not apply
for a license or request the approval of the Division until
December 19, 1973, a month after the transaction had been
terminated (Exhibit 8-P). Boyer testified that the corporation did not separately apply for a license until December of
1973 (T. 222). Mr. Francis testified that the first time his
Department had anything to do with The Boyer Company, a corporation, was beginning January 1, 1974 (T. 279). Thus, even
had plaintiff corporation thereafter become a licensed broker,
a position that defendants feel is not supported by the clear
law of this state, it could not have been licensed at the
time the act or service was rendered; therefore, plaintiffs'
claim of "substantial compliance" must fail.

If the corpor-

ation was not licensed at the time the act or service was
rendered, it is prohibited from maintaining an action in any
court for the recovery of commission pursuant to the terms of
§61-2-18, U.C.A.

Even if it subsequently became licensed, the

corporation's purported "substantial compliance" one month
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after the transition was terminated, fails to satisfy the
statutory requirement*
Even had it been properly licensed, the corporation
still cannot recover as will be discussed later since its sole
claim for commission is based upon the Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase, a document which was never accepted by
the defendants and which, by its own terms, lapsed one day
after it was proffered (Finding No. 10, R. 195).
Point III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY AMPLE
EVIDENCE AND MUST BE SUSTAINED.
On appeal, the evidence must be viewed in a light most
favorable to sustain the lower court.

The findings are pre-

sumed to be valid and correct and will not be disturbed unless
they are clearly contrary to the evidence, and the appellant
must sustain the burden of showing error.

Hardy v. Hendrickson,

27 Ut.2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (19 72) ; Carlton v. Hackett, 11
Ut.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).

Defendants submit that the

findings of the Trial Court are adequately supported by the
evidence and must be sustained by this Court on appeal. Defendants acknowledge that there were some areas where the
testimony was in dispute, but a mere conflict of testimony is
not sufficient to overturn the Court's findings.

As this

Court has stated:
"The resolution of the dispute in this
case is governed by that old and oft-repeated
rule that where the evidence is in conflict, it
is the trial court's prerogative to believe that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which it finds more convincing, and that its
findings will not be disturbed on appeal so long
as there is some substantial evidence to support
them," McCarren v. TVlerrill, 15 Ut.2d 179, 389
P.2d 732 (1964).
Defendants submit that at best plaintiffs1 arguments
show no more than a conflict in the testimony, in which case
the Trial Court's findings should not be disturbed.10

There

is, in the record, competent testimony supporting all of the
Court1s factual findings.

The Trial Court made its findings,

which were adverse to the plaintiffs, after hearing testimony
from the parties, which, testimony was at various times in
dispute.

The findings were reviewed again by the Trial Court

upon plaintiffs1 motion and were again reaffirmed by it (R.
215).

This Court has frequently indicated that where com-

petent evidence supports the factfinder's conclusions, it
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Trial Court,
even if it disagrees with its findings.

Pitcher v. Lorensen,

18 Ut.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967).
A.

Defendants acted in good faith in their dealings

with plaintiffs and made reasonable efforts to consummate the
sale.
On October 15, 1973, Todd's first day back in the
office after he had been out of town, Boyer telephoned him
°An action for breach of contract is an action at law,
rather than equity. Flynn v. Shocker Const. Co., 23 Ut.2d 140,
459 P.2d 433 (1969). In an action of law, the appellate court
does not reverse on issues of fact where the trial court's
findings are supported by the evidence or the absence of it.
Martin v. Martin, 29 Ut.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102 (1973).
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and indicated to Todd that he (Todd) was to call MacLeod
concerning the assumption of the mortgage by the Osmond Brothers and further indicated to Todd that the matter of the
deletion could be worked out (T. 21, 83, Boyer Depo. p. 43).
Boyer testified that he told Todd that the contract was acceptable to the Osmonds as amended.

This fact was denied by

Todd and, on disputed evidence, the Court concluded that the
counter-offer was never accepted (R. 187). Costley testified
that he first became aware of the deletion of the lease-back
provision when he received an amended copy of the Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase in the mail, which document was received by him on October 15, 1973 (T. 118, Finding
No. 9, R. 195). Costley further testified that he telephoned
Callister to discuss the deletion of the lease-back provision
with him within a week to ten days thereafter (T. 119).
Plaintiff states, in its brief

that "in that conversation

the two decided that the Osmond Brothers would agree to enter
into the Earnest Money Agreement as modified."

Costley there-

after phoned Boyer and told him that the deletion was acceptable (T. 121). Thus, there is evidence from plaintiffs1
own witness that the decision to go ahead was not even made
until at least a week after plaintiffs1 purported conversation.
Defendants submit that there is ample evidence to corroborate
the testimony of Dr. Todd concerning that disputed conversation.

Be that as it may, Dr. Todd immediately telephoned
Appellantfs brief, page
-23-

6.
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Mr. MacLeod at his home in Boulder, Colorado, to discuss the
transaction with him (T. 27, 81, Exhibit 8-P) . Thereafter Todd
telephoned MacLeod on the 17th and 18th of October and again
on the 25th, 26th and 29th of that month.

Todd testified that

MacLeod told him unequivocally that Northwestern would not
allow the Osmonds to assume the mortgage at the 7% rate (T. 27,
38, 157).

Todd then requested that MacLeod indicate to him

what the insurance company would be willing to do.

MacLeod

indicated he would get with his board of directors and let
Todd know, but he never did so (T. 28, 47-48).

Todd felt,

based upon his prior dealings with MacLeod that MacLeod's
response was final and left no room for negotiation and that
any further offers or proposals would have to come from
MacLeod (T. 31, 38-39).

Todd thereafter conveyed the refusal

of MacLeod to Boyer (T. 5Q).
During his conversations with MacLeod, MacLeod indicated that he did not know who the Osmonds were, so Todd told
him about them.

Todd indicated that the Osmonds were sub-

stantial people, were good people to deal with and otherwise
placed them in a most favorable light (T. 48, MacLeod Depo.
pp. 26, 59, 6Q, 66). At no time did Todd tell MacLeod not to
deal with the Osmonds or with their representative Boyer
(MacLeod Depo. p. 46); in fact, Todd told MacLeod that they
were allowing Boyer to call him directly (T. 28, 76). Thus,
12

Although MacLeod did not recall making that statement
he testified that such a refusal would have been "quite possible
if not probable" (MacLeod Depo. pp. 44-45) and part of his
negotiating posture on behalf of Northwestern (MacLeod Depo.
pp. 47, 59).
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the conduct of Todd was hardly that of one attempting to
block the sale as plaintiffs urge; rather, at all times his
actions were to the contrary.
On the 26th of October, Todd and Lignell, at their own
expense, met with Boyer and also invited their attorney, Earl
D. Tanner, to discuss the problems presented by MacLeod's
refusal to allow the assumption and discuss alternative ways
to accomplish their goal.

At that meeting, Boyer requested

permission to telephone MacLeod directly, which permission was
freely granted by defendants (T. 209). Approximately four
days after the meeting at the Ft. Douglas Club, Boyer participated in meetings with Costley and Callister, discussing
incentives that they would be willing to offer in order to
induce Northwestern to allow the assumption of the mortgage by
the Osmonds.

Although many of these possible inducements

were spelled out to Boyer, they were only communicated by him
to Todd in a general way and Todd was not privy to the details
thereof or to the determination as to which, if any, of the
incentives the Osmond Brothers would actually be willing to
give (T. 238) . Thus, Todd can hardly be criticized for failing to convey information he never received and upon which the
proposed buyer's agents had not even agreed.
The sole basis upon which plaintiffs predicate their
contention that defendants exercised bad faith is the failure
of Todd to write a letter, as requested by Boyer on the 2nd of
November.

Todd indicated he felt the request from Boyer was

questioning his integrity and the representations that had
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been made by him concerning his telephone calls to MacLeod
and the discussions concerning the proposed transaction.
Boyer indicated that he asked Todd to make a formal request,
Todd denied that fact and inidicated that Boyer had merely
asked him to write a letter (T. 50)•
It is interesting to note that MacLeod, in his deposition, indicated that in his first conversation with Boyer,
he requested that Boyer have Todd give him a call (MacLeod
Depo. p. 5 ) . MacLeod did not at anytime tell Todd that a
formal application from him relating to the proposed transaction was required (T. 253, MacLeod Depo, p. 47), nor did he
tell Todd that he would not deal with the Osmonds without his
(Todd's) okay (MacLeod Depo, p. 60), In fact, on an earlier
occasion MacLeod freely dealt with outside parties without
defendants1 prior knowledge and without their consent (T.
253, Exhibits 6-P and 7-P). It is, therefore, pure conjecture on the part of plaintiffs that Todd exercised bad faith
in failing to write the letter, and such conjecture is directly
contrary to the specific Finding No. 6 of the Trial Court (R.
194) .
Plaintiffs proposed deleting Finding No. 6 and substituting therefore their Finding No. 13(g) which provided
that defendants had exercised bad faith in the transaction,
the position they are urging on this appeal.

That propos-

ition was rejected by the Trial Court.
The actions of Todd in failing to write the letter
have to be further viewed in light of the fact that he felt
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he did not have a deal with the Osmonds (T. 156). The Court
agreed and held that the counter-offer had not been accepted
by plaintiffs (Finding No. 11, R. 195). There was, therefore, no requirement that Todd do more to complete the transaction.

Defendants were free to terminate the listing agree-

ment at any time.

The listing agreement entered into between

defendants and H. Roger Boyer, the individual plaintiff, did
not give him an exclusive listing of the property, contained
no termination date, and provided that the commission would
be paid only upon the consummation of the sale.

Boyer test-

ified that all of his listing agreements were done by letter
or other document similar to that executed by defendants,
and that he did not use the standard listing agreement of the
Salt Lake Real Estate Board (T. 217). Since Boyer was not
given an exclusive listing for a set period of time, he cannot
complain. 13 He was entitled to a commission only if a sale
were actually consummated.

No sale was consummated and de-

fendants did not prevent the plaintiff from performing his
duties.

Defendants were free to terminate their relationship

with Boyer at any time.

The termination was done fairly and

in good faith by defendants on the 19th day of October, 1973,
at the request of the individual plaintiff, H. Roger Boyer
(Finding No. 17, R. 196) .

See Wicks v. Moyle, 103 Ut. 554,

137 P.2d 342 (1943).
13
^Boyer apparently reviewed the listing letter and
found it to be acceptable to him (T. 63-65).
x
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Plaintiffs attempt to inject two red herrings into
their appeal —

taxes and financing of other property.
I
1

Plaintiffs repeatedly assert that defendants
motivated by tax considerations.

actions were

Todd indicated that while

he was concerned about the recapture potential, as anyone
would be, his analysis showed that there would be no problem.

In spite of repeated questioning by plaintiffs' counsel

attempting to prove otherwise, Todd steadfastly maintained
that this was not one of the reasons the transaction was
terminated (T. 160). Further, Todd testified that he could
have taken a $200,000 tax gain without incurring any taxes
because of his accumulated loss carry-overs (T. 163, 164).
The contentions to the contrary noto being put forth by plaintiffs are wholly without merit.
Plaintiffs, on what is at best disputed testimony,
seek to have this Court believe that defendants financed
other parcels of property thereby obviating the necessity of
selling the subject building.

While Boyer produced some

notes of conversations with Todd purporting to estabalish that
fact, Todd denied that such statements were ever made and
further testified, without contradiction, that the alleged
transactions would have been impossible (T. 247-259). "
14

Todd testified that at the time they were not even
owners of the fee on one parcel and that on the other the
lending documents precluded a sale.
-28-
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B.

Prospective Buyers Were Not Ready/ Willing and

Able.
Plaintiffs contend that, in spite of the fact that the
listing agreement was a special listing agreement providing
that the commission would be earned only upon the consummation
of the sale, and that even though no sale was consummated,
they are, nevertheless, entitled to receipt of a commission.
In so doing, plaintiffs again attempt to blur the distinction
between the individual plaintiff, H. Roger Boyer, and the
corporation, The Boyer Company.

The evidence was clear, and

the Court found, that the claim of the individual plaintiff,
H. Roger Boyer, could be sustained only upon the listing
agreement (R. 186, Finding Nos. 4 and 5, R. 194). That
agreement provided that before any commission was paid the
sale must be consummated.

It is undisputed that no sale was

consummated.
Plaintiff Boyer testified that he did not assign any of
his rights in the listing agreement to the corporation and
that all of the efforts relating to the Earnest Money Agreement were done by the corporation (T. 223-224, Boyer Depo. pp.
59-60, Finding No. 16, R. 196).
The corporation's sole entitlement to a commission is
based upon the language in the Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase, wherein a commission in the sum of $28,500.00
is recited to The Boyer Company.

Since, however, that Ear-

nest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was not accepted by
sellers, that entire document, including any apparent
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-29-

i

agreement to pay a broker's commission, must fail.

In addition,

since there existed a listing agreement with another broker at
that time/ any agreement to pay a commission was, by the terms
of the Earnest Money Agreement, "of no force or effect" (Exhibit 1-P, Finding No. 15, R. 196). Further, by the terms
of the document, a return of the earnest money cancelled the
offer (Finding No. 7, R. 195). The money was returned on
November 26, 1973 (Finding No. 14, R. 196).
Plaintiffs seek, nevertheless, entitlement to a broker's commission based upon the claim that the purchasers
were "ready, willing and able," a term that has great significance in a general listing agreement, but which has no significance in this case in view of the special restrictions in
the subject listing agreement.

It is significant to note that

plaintiffs proposed a finding to that effect but that it was
refused by the Trial Court (T. 202).
Regarding the ability of the Osmonds to assume the
loan at 7%, Mr. MacLeod testified that it was the company
policy to have Northwestern "participate" in the re-sale of
the property where the interest rate is a factor (MacLeod
Depo. pp.20-23, 52) and that any sale to the Osmonds would
require adhering to the policy of improvement for Northwestern
(MacLeod Depo. p. 27).

MacLeod further testified that

Northwestern could not consider approving the sale to the
^ i n a previous assumption involving defendants, Northwestern had required the new borrower to pay a higher interest
rate (MacLeod Depo. pp. 20-21) .
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Osmonds except on conditions consistent with its policy of
effecting some improvement for itself (MacLeod Depo. p. 2 8). °
MacLeod acknowledged that he had no authority to guarantee
that the company would have approved the assumption had he
requested it.

His authority was not to approve, but just to

recommend (MacLeod Depo. p. 4Q). In fact, MacLeod acknowledged that he could not even state that he would have recommended the assumption without additional financial and other
information (MacLeod Depo. p. 63), but stated that there was
no guarantee that he would have recommended the assumption
even if pressed.

(MacLeod Depo. p. 70). Even had MacLeod

recommended it to the home office, there is, of course, no
assurrance that that recommendation would have been accepted.
C.

The Offer Was Impossible To Perform.

Plaintiffs attempt to persuade this Court to ignore a
major impediment to the consummation of the sale, to wit:
the separation of the mortgage and property between the apartment complex and the dental building. 17 There is no dispute
that the listing agreement specifically indicated to plaintiff
Boyer that the dental building was separate and apart from
the transaction and would not be sold but, rather, had to be
°MacLeod did state that he would have recommended the
assumption had the requests persisted, however, it would have
been a recommendation with great reluctance (MacLeod Depo.
p. 41) .
^•'Plaintiffs cavalierly brush this problem aside by
classifying it as "minimal, if not non-existent." (Brief of
appellants/plaintiffs, page 36).

-31-
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separated out.

While it is true that Todd indicated on many

occasions that he felt that this would not be a problem.,
MacLeodf the person who had to make the recommendation,
clearly and unequivocally stated that Northwestern would not
consider a division of the property securing the loan (MacLeod
Depo. pp. 28-31) .
In response to questions from plaintiffs1 counsel,
MacLeod testified as follows:
"There was one other feature, and that was
that we could not consider or would not consider
a^ division of the property securing the loan so
as to enable part of the loan being attributable
to the apartment complex and part of the loan
have a separate loan attributable to the medical
office building; so that whereas a sale of the
apartment might be taken to Osmonds, our loan
would have to stand on a composite property on
the entire property. We were not persuaded to
partition the loan. It would leave us with too
small a balance on the office building portion."
(MacLeod Depo. p. 29, Emphasis added).
Continuing en he stated:
Q,

That is, were there any concrete ideas as
to how the partitioning of the property
without the partitioning of the loan could
be dealt with?

A.

Well, I think we just, off the top, kicked
around how it might be effected within our
disinclination to do it, as to who should
receive the payment, as to whether they
could leaseback, I suppose. Well, as you
might judge, what would be the ways something like that could be handled. And I
believe that's what we simply focused on
conversationally for a few minutes.

Q,

I assume it was clear to both of you then
that there were ways that it could be done
without—

-32Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

No, I would assume—I wouldn't make that
assumption. I would say instead it
appeared as though there would be perhaps
difficulty in that. Well, simply perhaps
difficulty in that.

Q.

And that was left to something—

A.

Our position was pretty well defined? we
couldn't countenance a division of the loan.

Q.

Then I take it it was left that that would
have to be worked out in some fashion between
the Osmonds and Todd and Lignell so that
it did not adversely affect Northwestern1s
position.

A.

I would assume.

. Mr. Bowen:
A.

Objection, leading.

I don't know that I would accept it anyway.
It wasn't a matter of adversely affecting
Northwestern's position because Northwestern
wouldn't let its position be changed so
that it would be adverse or beneficial. This
is something we were not willing to consider.
We had a loan on the entire property and
we were willing to consider an increase on
that loan on terms consistent with current
market, taking on Osmonds. But to go further and have separate loans was not a
matter we would consider at a l l / (MacLeod
Depo. pp. 29-31, Emphasis Added).

Although the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase obligated the Osmond Brothers to assume the mortgage of
$512,000.00, Todd testified that that was the total mortgage
on both parcels of property and that 87% of that figure applied
to the apartment complex and 13% to the dental building (T. 62).
Mr. Costley testified that he knew the Osmond Brothers
weren't purchasing the dental building (T. 145). Mr. Callister
testified that the Osmond Brothers would not assume the mortgage on the dental building (Callister Depo. pp. 39-40).
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Two

i

things, therefore, are readily apparent:
(1)

The Osmonds apparently had offered to assume the

full mortgage on both parcels of property when in actual fact
they had only intended to assume 87% of that mortgage.

Hence,

there was, at best, a mistake in their offer and no meeting
of the minds between the offerors and the offerees.

Absent a

meeting of the minds, even if the offer had been accepted,
there could be no contract.

Wicks' v. Moyle, 10 3 Ut. 55 4, 13 7

P.2d 342 (1943) .
(2)

The offer was impossible to perform.

The doctors

insisted that the dental building be split out, the Osmonds
were only purchasing the apartment building and Northwestern
would not separate the parcels of property.

See Stewart v.

Lesin, 5 Ut.2d 383, 302 P.2d 714 (1956).
Although plaintiffs contend to the contrary, the evidence is clear that although the Osmonds may have been anxious
and probably financially able to purchase the property, they
were not ready to do so —

there were still too many details

left to be finalized by them -- and they were not willing to
do so upon the terms of the offer since they would not assume
the full mortgage and they had not waived the 7% assumption
requirement.

In addition, they were not physically able to

purchase the property since Northwestern would not divide
the parcels.

Even though the. test in this case is not a ready,

willing and able purchaser but the actual consummation of the
sale, the Osmond Brothers did not meet even the more liberal
test advocated by plaintiffs.
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Both Callister and Costley testified that at their
meeting of October 30/ 1973, they discussed the possibility of
providing some "incentives" to Northwestern to induce it to
consent to the assumption.

Both Costley and Callister, how-

ever, indicated that although they discussed what they might
be willing to do, they did not finalize their discussions or
come up with a concrete proposal or list of things that they
would, in fact, be willing to do (T. 138, 213). 1 8

Further

there was never an agreement to waive the 7% requirement (T.
133, 214).
D.

Plaintiffs' Authorities Are Inapplicable To The

Facts Upon Which The Trial Court Ruled.
The Trial Court found that the listing agreement in
this matter was a special listing agreement, and that a condition precedent to the payment of any commission to H. Roger
Boyer was the consummation of the transaction and actual receipt of the proceeds by defendants (Finding No. 4, R. 194).
Plaintiffs do not contest this finding, and indeed they cannot
since the evidence is absolutely clear on this point (Exhibit
1-P)•

It is the clearly established law in this state that on

a special listing agreement of this type, a broker is not
entitled to a commission if the desired sale is not, in fact,
18
Callister testified that the Osmonds might be willing
to increase the loan rate by 1/4 to 1/2 percent (Callister
Depo. p. 25), while Boyer indicated that the Osmonds would be
willing to increase it by 2% (Boyer Depo. p. 46).
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consummated, even though a ready, willing and able purchaser
is found.

Wicks w

Moyle, supra; Watson v. O'Dell, 58 Ut.

276, 198 P. 772 (1921).
Plaintiffs, however, seek to avoid the clear mandate of
the law and place their hopes upon two cases, Hoyt v. Wasatch
Homes

and Curtis W

apposite here.

Mortensen, the facts of which are both in-

In Curtis v. Mortensen, the broker had pro-

cured from the potential seller a general listing agreement
for a period of six months which provided that the broker
would be entitled to his commission if he produced a ready,
willing and able buyer, clearly not the situation here.
Further, the broker procured an Earnest Money Agreement, signed
by both the buyer and the seller.

Subsequent thereto, the

seller changed his mind and the Earnest Money Agreement was
rescinded

by the parties.

case are obvious.

The distinctions in the instant

Here there was no acceptance of the Earnest

Money Agreement but rather a counter-offer was prepared, which
counter-offer was not accepted by the buyers (Finding Nos. 10
and 11, R. 195) . Even had it been accepted, since the buyers
at no time waived the requirement that they be allowed to assume
the 7% mortgage or obtain equivalent financing (T. 138), plaintiff, at best, would have produced a one-sided non-contract.
The defendants had no power to require the Osmonds to buy or to
otherwise perform since the Osmonds at any time could back out
of the transaction by claiming that the condition precedent to
their purchase, the assumption of the 7% loan, could not be
accomplished and would not be waived by them.

This very
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proposition was recognized in the Curtis case wherein the
Court stated:
"It is obvious that the reason this court
has stated in the above cited cases that a binding
agreement or offer of the buyer is necessary if a
broker is to be entitled to his commission is to
protect the seller from being obligated to pay a
commission where the proposed buyer either cannot
or will not perform and the seller is left without
a remedy which he can enforce against the buyer."
Curtis v. Mortenson, 1 Ut.2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (1954).
Thus, even had the counter-offer of defendants been accepted,
there would still not have been created a binding contract
until the Osmonds either assumed the loan or waived that requirement, neither of which occurred.
While it is true that the Hoyt case concerned a special
listing agreement and although no sale was consummated a
broker's commission was awarded, the facts of that case are
far different from the facts in the instant case.

In Hoyt,

the seller had executed a binding contract to sell with the
potential buyer.

The seller was "bought off" by the buyer and

the agreement was rescinded; thereafter, the sellers arbitrarily refused to cooperate in the consummation of the sale.
Further, the real estate broker was procured by the sellers
and was acting as their agent, and the court there found
that the buyers were, in fact, ready, willing and able to
perform.
In the instant case there was no binding agreement
between the parties.

Plaintiffs1 offer was not accepted;

defendants' counter-offer was not accepted; therefore, there
-37-
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could be no rescision of a binding agreement as was found in
Hoyt.

Further, as set forth above, the Osmonds were not ready

{

and willing to make the purchase upon the terms set forth in
the respective offers•

In fact, the purchase contemplated by

the parties could not be consummated due to the impossibility
of separating out the dental building.

It should be further

pointed out that in the instant case, the broker was the agent
for the buyers, not the sellers, and that his involvement in
the transaction was on behalf of his cousin's clients and
the Shaughnessey Apartment was only one of many other parcels
of property being investigated by plaintiff for the Osmonds
at that time (T. 146, Callister Depo. p. 44).
In addition, there was neither a refusal to cooperate
or a deliberate obstruction of the sale by defendants as was
found in Hoyt.

In Hoyt, the Court specifically did not deal

with the question of whether or not a special listing agreement and the earnest money receipt could stand independently
of one another, or whether the restricting feature in the
special listing agreement, although not spelled out in the
earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, was nevertheless,
a condition precedent to the recovery of a commission.
When faced with a similar question, the Supreme Court
of Washington, in Harding v. Rock, 60 Wash. 2d 348, 363 P.2d
784 (1962) held that where the listing agreement provided for
a broker's commission payable at the closing of a sale, and
where the purchase agreement contained a different provision,
-38-
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<

providing an unconditional promise to pay a commission, the
limiting provision of the listing agreement, must be read in
conjunction with the purchase agreement, and, hence, entitlement to a commission would accrue only upon the consummation of
the sale.

In the instant case, plaintiffs recognized that the

limiting provision of the listing agreement was intended
to carry through to the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase.

In fact, plaintiffs1 counsel so stipulated during

the trial of the cause (T. 44), and Todd so testified without
contradiction (T. 43).
Since the plaintiffs agree that the payment of a commission under the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase
was not unconditional but was limited to the actual consummation of a sale, they should not now be heard to claim a
commission absent a sale.
Further, this is not a case where the sellers procured
a broker who worked diligently for them, produced a buyer upon
the terms set forth by seller and obtained a fully executed
agreement to purchase and then was cut off and left high and
dry by his sellers who went behind his back and sold the
property.

In fact, Boyer stated that he didn't care who paid

the commission, the Osmonds or the defendants (Boyer Depo. p.
23).

It just happened that a commission provision was included

in the Earnest Money Agreement.

The testimony further indi-

cated that the property was not even sold until 13 months
later and then at a price far less than that contemplated in
the Osmond Brothers transaction (T. 26).
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Point TV
NEITHER THE EARNEST MONEY OFFER NOR DEFENDANTS f COUNTEROFFER WERE EVER ACCEPTED
Plaintiffs apparently contend that the Court erred in
its finding that the counter-offer was never accepted by the
buyers (Finding No. 11, R. 19 5) and claim that that finding in
reality implies acceptance.
Todd stated that the purported oral acceptance of Boyer
was never communicated to him (T. 51-52).

The Court accepted

the testimony of Todd on this point (Finding No. 11, R. 19 5;
Memorandum Decision <j[ 3, R. 187). That testimony is amply supported by the testimony of Costley, as has been previously
pointed out.

It is undisputed that there was no written acc-

eptance of the counter-offer by anyone (Finding No. 12, R.
195) .
Plaintiffs misapprehend what is involved here.

Although

plaintiffs contend that Callister and Costley thought they had
a deal, the mere mental acceptance of an offer by an agent
cannot give rise to a legally binding contract.

Both Call-

ister and Costley stated unequivocally that they did not communicate an acceptance of the counter-offer to defendants,,
neither did they accept the counter-offer in writing or authorize anyone else to do it on their behalf (T. 136, Callister
Depo. p. 42). That they may have communicated their acceptance
to Boyer, their agent, and formed in his mind a conclusion
that the counter-offer was acceptable is still insufficient to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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create a legally binding contract.

Based on these premises,

the Court's finding that there was no acceptance of the counter
offer in a legally binding fashion is sound.
Even if the Court had believed Boyer that the conversation of October 15th was as he claimed that too would have
been insufficient to constitute an acceptance in a legally
binding fashion for the following reasons:

(1)

the purported

acceptance occurred more than one day after the counter-offer
was made, (2) the purported acceptance was not in writing.
See Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Ut.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971);
and, (3) there is no evidence that Boyer as a sub-agent had
authority to accept the counter-offer on behalf of the Osmonds.
As a matter of fact, defendants contend the evidence clearly
shows he had no such authority.

Boyer journeyed to Ogden with

the Earnest Money Agreement and obtained Costley's signature
thereon on behalf of the Osmonds; further he knew he had to
obtain the approval by Costley and Callister of the counteroffer.

Absent that authority Boyer could accept the counter-

offer in any fashion.

See Equitable Realty Inc. v. Nielson,

30 Ut.2d 433, 519 P.2d 243 (1974); Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26
Ut.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971).

-41-
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Point V
LACK OF AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT PRECLUDES RECOVERY
BY PLAINTIFFS UNDER ANY THEORY.
Plaintiffs only raise objections to two of the Court's
findings—No. 6 and No. 17.

Therefore, the remaining unchal-

lenged findings must be accepted by this Court.

The Trial

Court found that the defendants did not accept the proffered
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, and that it
expired by its own terms one day later and ceased to have any
legal force or effect (Finding No. 10', R. 19 5) . The Court
further found that the acts of defendants constituted a counteroffer and that the counter-offer was never accepted by the
proposed buyers, the Osmond Brothers (Finding No. 11, R. 195).
See Lynn v. K. C. Ranches, Inc., 19 Ut.2d 3, 425 P.2d 4Q3
(1967).
Boyer acknowledged that the Earnest Money Agreement was
not accepted by the defendants (T. 238). In his telephone
conversation with Mr. Callister, he indicated that the Earnest
Money Agreement been had been changed (T. 183, Callister Depo.
p. 20). There can be no doubt that since defendants did not
agree to all of the provisions of the offer there was no
binding contract.

R. J. Daum Const. Co. v. Child, 122 Ut.

194, 247 P.2d 817 (1952).

Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Ut.2d 83, 368

P.2d 597 (1962).
The corporate plaintiff's claim for entitlement to compensation is based exclusively upon the recitation in the
-42-
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Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase.

There can be no

claim by the corporation under the listing agreement since
that agreement was made with the individual plaintiff, H.
Roger Boyer (Finding No.

4, R. 194) , and none of the rights

of that listing agreement were ever transferred to the corporate plaintiff (T. 224, Boyer Depo. pp. 59-60).

The cor-

poration's sole claim for compensation, therefore, is based
upon a proposed contract that was never accepted and never
became binding upon any of the parties thereto.

Since there

never was a contract, the language contained in that document
upon which the corporate plaintiff relies is of no force or
effect.

This is true even if plaintiff corporation were

properly licensed, and even if the facts were as plaintiffs
contend; there is still no basis for the award of the requested
commission.

As this Court has stated:

"Since defendants were not bound by the
earnest money agreement, they were not as a matter
of law, liable to pay the commission." Frandsen
v. Gerstner, 26 Ut.2d 180, 487 P.2d 697 (1971).
The individual plaintiff, H. Roger Boyer's sole claim
to compensation is based upon the special listing agreement
between him and defendants.
fll, R. 186.

(Exhibit P-l, Memorandum Decision

That a'greement stated specifically that before

any commission was paid the sale must be consummated.

The

evidence clearly showed that all efforts to consummate a sale
of the property were done by the corporate plaintiff (T. 224,
Boyer Depo. pp. 59-60) , including the preparation of the
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Finding No. 7, R.
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194) . The Earnest Money Receipt does not provide for the
payment of any commission to the individual, H. Roger Boyer.
Rather, that document identifies the broker in three separate
places as "The Boyer Company" (Exhibit 2-P, lines 1, 44 and
58).19
Point VI
THE CONDUCT OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS MATTER WAS NOT
OF THE TYPE THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO COMPENSATION.
The conduct of the plaintiffs in the instant case is
far different from that in the cases relied upon by them.
Both Boyer and The Boyer Company were acting as the agents for
the buyers.

Boyer had participated in numerous meetings with

the buyers regarding this and other transactions.

Boyer was

concerned with the Osmonds and not with the welfare of defendents.

In fact, he freely discussed the buyer's ability to

reduce the purchase price based on defendants1 need for money.
His only contact with the defendants, however, was by random
telephone calls.

On only one occasion did he have a meeting

to discuss the transaction and that was at the request of
defendants and at their expense at the University Club (T.
87) .
The Earnest Money Agreement that was ultimately prepared was at variance with the listing agreement and as such
19

Had the Earnest Money Agreement been accepted, any
commission due thereunder would, by its terms, have been payable only to The Boyer Company.
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cannot give rise to a claim for compensation.

See Lynn v.

K.C. Ranches, Inc., 19 Ut. 2d 3, 425 P.2d 4Q3 (1967).

Although

the Earnest Money Agreement provided that the buyers were to
assume the mortgage at 7% it did not require the consent
to the transaction by Northwestern.

Consent to the trans-

action was important to the sellers inasmuch as the failure of
the insurance company to consent would obligate the sellers
to pay a $35,000.00 penalty payment (T. 45 and 84, MacLeod
Depo.

p. 28). Boyer was aware of this prepayment penalty

but did nothing about it.

(T. 214) . The earnest money in

this case was delivered by the Osmonds to their agent, therefore, at no time was there any consideration passed binding
the transaction.

While it is true, as plaintiffs contend,

that in many cases earnest money is not exchanged directly
between the parties to a transaction but goes to one's agent,
that situation is usually applicable where the real estate
broker is representing the sellers.

In those cases there is a

transfer of consideration from the buyers to the sellers when
the money is deposited with the seller's agent.

In the in-

stant case the money was transferred from the buyer to the
buyers agent.

There was no transfer of any type to the seller

or seller's agent; therefore, there was no consideration exu
changed in the transaction. 20
The testimony is clear that H. Roger Boyer did little,
if anything, to bring about the consummation of the sale.

He

20
W
A situation roughly analogous to the one presented
here was mentioned by the Court in Equitable Realty, Inc. v.
Nielson, 30 Digitized
Ut.2d
433, 519 P.2d 243 U974).
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left it to the doctors to work out all arrangements with the
insurance company.

Although he did telephone MacLeod on one

occasion in an attempt to facilitate the transaction, this
call was six days after he had been given permission to do so.
He made no proposals to MacLeod or to Todd and gave no directions to Todd in his dealings with MacLeod.

He made no offer

of assistance to Todd in attempting to facilitate the transaction.

In short, he sat back and let Todd attempt to earn

his commission for him, secure in the knowledge that if the
deal went through he would get his commission, and if it
didn't go through he would sue.

When it became apparent that

the deal was not going to go through/ he induced defendants to
send him a letter terminating the transaction, but failed to
advise them he was contemplating a suit for his commission
even though he had been thinking about it for many days (T.
210-211).
After the sale was scuttled, the property remained on
the market for another 13 months.

It was ultimately sold by

the doctors for less money than they had been offered in the
Osmond transaction.

The evidence is clear that Boyer himself

failed to work diligently to bring about the sale of the
property and therefore should not be entitled to a commission.
CONCLUSION
The findings entered by the Court are based upon clear
and competent evidence and therefore must be sustained by this
Court on appeal.

The plaintiffs, having lost at trial, and
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having lost on their motion to amend the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, now seek on this appeal to raise the same
precise issues that they twice raised in the Trial Court and
twice lost.

The attempt by plaintiffs to go behind the Find-

ings and Conclusions other than to determine whether they are
supported by the evidence, if sustained, would open up a Pandora's box, would allow a losing litigant to have three or
four bites from the apple causing great confusion both at the
trial and appellate level and would destroy the clear rules of
appellate practice which have been long established in this
state.

This is particularly so in the instant case where the

Court on two occasions, reflected upon the findings objected
to by plaintiffs and found them to be in accordance with its
ruling.
The statutes in this state are clear.

A corporation

must be licensed as a broker or it cannot sue to recover a
real estate commission.

In spite of the contentions of plain-

tiffs to the contrary the construction given to those statutes
by the Real Estate Division recognized a distinction between
an individual and a corporate broker.

But even if they did

not, such interpretations must give way to the clear mandate of the Legislature.
The plaintiff corporation made no attempt to become
licensed or to otherwise qualify with the real estate division
until approximately one month after the instant transaction
failed; therefore, even if the statutory interpretation urged
by plaintiffs were correct, plaintiff corporation cannot
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recover.

Its failure to timely apply for a real estate bro-

ker's license is fatal to its cause.
The evidence indicates that Todd worked diligently to
bring about the consummation of the sale while plaintiffs,
agents for the buyers, did little if anything.

The findings

of the Court that defendants exercised good faith and did not
refuse to cooperate or otherwise block the sale are supported
by ample and clear evidence and must be sustained on appeal.
Further, the buyers procured by plaintiffs were not ready,
willing and able to perform under the terms of the Earnest
Money Agreement, as amended and the Court implicitly so found.
The transaction, as contemplated was impossible to perform and
the conditions placed in the agreement by the prospective
purchasers had not been waived by them.
The overriding consideration, however, is that the
corporate plaintiff's sole entitlement to compensation is
based upon an Earnest Money Agreement that was never accepted
by either one of the parties.

A non-existent agreement cannot

give rise to a valid obligation to pay based thereon.

The

individual plaintiff did not fulfill the terms of the listing
agreement since no sale was consummated and he is precluded
from recovery.
The judgment of the lower Court was entered after carefully considering the evidence, observing the demeanor of the
witnesses and reviewing the exhibits.

Its determination was

again reviewed after extensive argument by counsel in relation
to plaintiffs objection to the Findings and Conclusions.
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It

is in the province of the Trial Court to resolve areas of
conflicting testimony and to render its judgment in accordance
with the facts as determined.

This careful consideration by

the Trial Court should not be overturned on appeal.

The

judgment of the lower Court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES
Earl D. Tanner
J. Thomas Bowen
Attorneys for Respondents.
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